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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to the Labor Commission
Act, the Administrative Procedures Act and the Judicial Code. Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-1303(6) (2005); 63-46b-16(l) (2004); 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Labor Commission abused its discretion by virtue of its appointment

of a medical panel and delegating to the medical panel chairman the discretion to appoint other
panel members, specifically, Dr. Laird Swenson, M.D.?
The standard of review for abuse of discretion is whether the Labor Commission's exercise
of discretion "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Neiderhauser Ornamental
& Metal Works Co. v. Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1993); King v. Industrial
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (1993).
2.

Whether the Labor Commission abused its discretion by failing to include the

report of Dr. Dan J. Hammon, M.D. in the medical record referred to the medical panel?
The standard of review for abuse of discretion is set forth under Issue No. 1, above.
3.

Whether the Labor Commission properly found a medical causal connection

between the industrial accident and Petitioner's (hereinafter "Delaney") left ulnar nerve
condition?
The standard of review for factual determinations is whether the Labor Commission's
factual findings are "supported by substantial evidence." "Substantial evidence is csuch relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.'" Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 68 (1989) (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho
257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 n.5 (1985)).

1

TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1

The full text of the provision dealing with medical panel referrals is set foith

veibatun m the Addendum to Delaney's buef Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-601 (2005)
2

The full text of the provision dealing with uiles of evidence and proceduie before

the Labor Commission is set forth veibatim in the Addendum to this brief Id § 34A-2-802
3

The full text of the Laboi Commission rule/regulation regarding guidelines for the

utilization of medical panels is set forth verbatim in the Addendum to this brief Utah Admin
Code § R602-2-2 (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case

This matter is a Petition for Review from the final agency action of the Laboi
Commission of Utah in fomial adjudicative proceedings involving a claim for industrial accident
under the Workers' Compensation Act
b.

Course of Proceedings

Delaney1 filed an Application for Hearing on December 5, 20032 alleging injuries to her
thoiacic spine and left upper extremity ansmg from an mdustnal accident on Febiuary 19, 2003,
when the "collimator" on an x-ray machine at Paik City Family Healthcare (heiemafter
"PCFH"), where she was employed, fell onto her left ami (R 25-66)
On Januaiy 5, 2004, Respondents PCFH and Workers Compensation Fund (heiemafter,
collectively, "WCF") filed an Answei, which, inter aha, denied the allegation that the injuries
weie medically caused by the alleged accident In the Answer, WCF stated that it was going to

1

Delaney s then surname was "Pashuta"
The Application was initially filed on Novembei 19, 2003 howevei, the Laboi Commission did not issue a Notice
of Foimal Adjudicative Pioceedmgs & Oidei foi Answei until the Decembei 5, 2003 date (R 1-23, 67-68)
1

2

obtain an independent medical examination (hereinafter "IME") to support its denial of medical
causation 3 (R. 69-70).
On April 13, 2004 (dated April 8, 2004), Delaney filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's
Answer, inter alia, on the grounds that WCF's denial of medical causation was not supported by
medical documentation as required by Labor Commission rules/regulations. (R. 74-75).
Although WCF responded timely to the Motion to Strike, contending that the documentation
would be forthcoming either through the IME or the signed opinion of Dr. Roger Stuart, M.D.,
the Medical Director of WCF, the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") granted
Delaney's motion and entered and order striking WCF's defense as to medical causation.5 (R.
83-96).
The matter proceeded to hearing on the remaining issues on June 3, 2004. At the hearing,
WCF proffered a signed duplicate of the May 1, 2003 letter from Dr. Stuart, along with some late
obtained medical records from The Orthopedic Specialty Hospital (hereinafter "TOSH")
Physical Therapy showing that Delaney had been treated in 2001 (hereinafter "TOSH Physical
Therapy (2001) records") for a left upper extremity condition. Although the ALJ did not admit
the records into evidence because of his earlier ruling on the Motion to Strike, he did maintain
them in the Labor Commission file as Exhibits R-l and R-2, respectively.

(R. 104-115, 376

[transcript of June 3, 2004 hearing] at pp. 5-12).

' At the time of the Answei, WCF did have an unsigned lettei from its Medical Dnectoi, later identified as Roger
Stuait, that suppoited the denial of medical causation but, at the time the Answer was filed, did not intend to lely
upon that opinion without it being signed (R 94-96)
Because the Motion to Stnke was gianted, WCF was unable to conduct the IME that was scheduled befoie hearing
^ WCF actually piesented the unsigned lettei fiom Di Stuait in support of a Motion to Continue the Heaung, which
included a lequest that he leconsidei his decision to stnke the medical causation defense (R 93-96)
6
Delaney is conect that, foi some leason, the signed lettei fiom Di Stuart is not now in the lecoid The TOSH
Physical Therapy lecoids ai_e in the lecoid (R 105-115), although not as Exhibit R-2, as pioffeied at the heaung

3

On November 26, 2004, the ALJ entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order (hereinafter "11/26/04 Order") finding in favor of Delaney on all issues7 then before the
Labor Commission and ordering WCF to pay benefits in accordance with the findings. (R. 147156).
On December 21, 2004, WCF timely filed a Motion for Review of the 11/26/04 Order on
the grounds that failure to admit Dr. Stuart's letter and the TOSH Physical Therapy records from
2001, as well as not allowing the IME to proceed, violated administrative, statutory and
constitutional provisions of due process.8 (R. 157-167)
Delaney timely responded to WCF's Motion for Review, and on April 29, 2005, the
Appeals Board of the Labor Commission entered an Order Granting Motion for Review and
Order of Remand determining that procedural mles "must be reasonable and fair under the
circumstances" and remanded the matter to the ALJ to "conduct additional proceedings". (R.
192-196).
In furtherance of the Appeals Board order, on May 9, 2005, the ALJ entered an Order
reopening the Medical Records Exhibit for the introduction of additional evidence on the issue of
medical causation by August 9, 2005 (hereinafter "the 5/9/05 Order"). (R. 198). Based upon the
5/9/05 Order, WCF immediately rescheduled the IME with Dr. Hammon for June 28, 2005. (R.
262, 264).
Despite the clear ruling of the Appeals Board and the 5/9/05 Order, Delaney refused to
appear at the IME on June 28, 2005 so WCF filed a motion to compel her attendance at the

1

Of couise, the issue of medical causation had aheady been ruled upon by the Older on Motion to Stnke The
lemaining issue was legal causation
8
Delaney also filed a Motion for Review to conect some clencal enors in the 11/26/04 Oidei. Rather than allow
that to proceed to the Laboi Commissionei, the ALJ simply made the clencal conections in an Older Nunc Pio
Tunc (R 172-181)

4

IME and, because the date for the IME had already passed, rescheduled it for August 16, 2005,
the next date that Dr. Hammon was available. (R. 263, 265). The ALJ granted the motion to
compel, but made no comment about the fact that the IME was set for a date after the medical
record would be closed under the 5/9/05 Order. (R. 268). After the order granting the motion to
compel was granted, Delaney filed an untimely response to the motion to compel, which stated,
inter alia, that the scheduling of the IME for August 16, 2005 would not afford her the ten days
allotted under the 5/9/05 Order (to August 19, 2005) to respond to the IME report with a counter
report from her treating physician. (R. 270-271).
Although Delaney's response to the motion to compel was not timely, the ALJ apparently
agreed with her contention and, on August 25, 2005, entered Interim Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order (hereinafter "the 8/25/05 Order") without awaiting the IME
report from Dr. Hammon.9 (R. 286-94). In the 8/25/05 Order the ALJ determines that, based
upon the signed report of Dr. Stuart dated May 1, 2003 and the TOSH Physical Therapy (2001)
records showing some left shoulder and elbow problems in 2001, as against the opinions of Dr.
Sellers and June Neely10 (Delaney's treating medical providers), Delaney's left upper extremity
problems were caused by Delaney's industrial accident, there was a dispute in the medical
records as to medical causation requiring that "the issued [sic] must be referred to a medical
panel for consideration." (R. 290).
On September 28, 2005, the ALJ formally appointed Dr. Alvin J. Wirthlin, M.D. as
chairman of the medical panel and gave Dr. Wirthlin discretion to "select specialists you deem
appropriate to assist you in your evaluation." (R. 310-311). Although enclosed with the referral

9

Di. Hammon*s report dated August 16, 2005 was not available and submitted to the Labor Commission until
September 8, 2005. (R. 297-303).
10
Ms. Neely is a nurse practitioner also employed by PCFH. (R. 250).

5

lcttei are "all

available medical lecoids", it is unclcai whethei the lepoits fiom Dr Stuait and

TOSH Physical Therapy (2001) were enclosed, howcvei, The 8/25/05 Oiclei was also enclosed,
which summan/ed those recoids (R 290, 310)
Dr Wnthlin also appointed Dr Laird Swenson, M D , to paiticipate with him on the
panel Those physicians examined Delaney and conducted their evaluation on January 11, 2006
The medical panel submitted its repoit to the ALJ on February 16, 2006

(R 312-317)

In its

report, the panel refened to the repoits of Dr Sellers, Tune Neely and the lepoits of Dr Stuart
and TOSH Physical Theiapy (2001)

u

(R 314) On the crucial issue of medical causation foi

Delaney's injuries, the medical panel opined that although Delaney had a thoracic strain caused
by the accident, "[i]t is not piobable that an episode of lesisted flexion at the elbow would
produce a direct ulnar nerve injury

It is clear from the record that there was no direct blow oi

injury to the elbow itself Thus, a mechanism of injury is not present Furthermore, a conclusion
of causation would have to overcome the observation that at least two and as many as four weeks
passed befoie the ulnar nerve symptoms were appreciated This would not be the expected time
course for an injury to the ulnar nerve which occuned on the 19th of Februaiy 2003 Therefore,
we conclude that it is not leasonably probable that the left ulnai nerve pioblems weie the lesult
of the mdustnal accident on February 19, 2003 " (R 316)
c.

Disposition of Agency

Although Petitioner objected to the medical panel report, in part because of the favoiable
opinion of Dr Hammon, the ALJ ovenuled the objection and, on March 6, 2006, enteicd
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Oidei (hereinafter "the 3/6/06 Order") (R 326-337)

11

Since the medical panel leport only mentions the lefeience to such iecoids in the 8/25/05 Older it must be
assumed that the medical panel did not actually have those lecoids including any knowledge of the souice of the
TOSH Physical Theiapy (2001) iecoids

6

Based upon the medical panel report,12 in the 3/6/06 order the ALJ determined that the industrial
accident of February 19, 2003 "did not cause [Delaney's] ulnar nerve problems" (R. 332, 334)
and limited Delaney's recovery to temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses
related to her thoracic problems only. (R. 334-35).
Delaney timely filed a Motion for Review of the 3/6/06 order to the Labor Commissioner
contending, inter alia, that despite the medical panel's decision, the preponderance of the
evidence establishes that her accident on February 19, 2003 caused her ulnar nerve injury; that
WCF improperly pursued criminal prosecution for fraud and perjury related to her denial, under
oath, that she had ever had any previous left upper extremity problems; and that Dr. Swenson's
service on the medical panel "taints the panel's decision." (R. 338-347, 353).
On April 27, 2006, the Labor Commissioner entered an Order Denying Motion for
Review, holding that the ALJ's referral to a medical panel was appropriate, that despite Dr.
Swenson's apparent association with TOSH,13 which in turn has a relationship with Respondent
PCFH, Delaney "failed to explain how Dr. Swenson's ordinary professional relationship with
TOSH had any actual effect on his impartiality or performance as a member of the medical
panel, nor do Dr. Swenson's circumstances give rise to any reasonable perception of partiality."
(R. 354). Moreover, the Labor Commissioner held that the medical panel's decision was well
reasoned. Finally, the Labor Commissioner determined that the criminal investigations and
Delaney's complaints about the same were irrelevant to the determination of medical causation.
(R. 354-55).

12

The ALJ found it "to be an unbiased, objective analysis of the medical evidence." (R. 331 n.l).
"' Since, as aheady stated, it appears that the medical panel did not even know that the TOSH Physical Therapy
(2001) records existed, it is questionable that Dr. Swenson even knew of a potential conflict of interest. Moreover,
the relationship between TOSH and PCFH "cuts both ways" since many of Delaney's health care providers,
including June Neely, also work for PCFH.

7

Delaney filed a lequest foi leconsideiation14 on May 17, 2006

(R 357-361)

The

Labor Commission found "no leason to modify its pievious decision" and denied the lequest for
leconsideiation
d.

Statement of Facts

On hebruaiy 19, 2003, Delaney was employed at PLhH as an x-ray technician, among
other duties

Delaney was using an old x-ray machine at the Canyons Ski Patiol Clinic

The

machine had some mechanical problems that often requned that she "hold up" a colhmatoi aim
weighing 25 pounds while an x-iay was taken because the locking knob did not woik On one
occasion on February 19, 2003, Delaney pushed up the collimator to tiy to make it stay in
position but it swung down and caused her left ami to hit her m the chest

Also, the 85 pound

arm of the x-ray machine swung down onto Delaney's left ami (R 288)
Because of this accident, June Neely, a nuise piactitioner at PCFH opmed that Delaney's
neck and arm pain were related to the accident on February 19, 2003 Later, Dr Daniel Sellers,
M D saw Delaney and, on June 5, 2004, diagnosed Delaney with left medial epicondylitis and
ulnar neuropathy in her left arm, which he connected to the accident of February 19, 2003 (R
289-90)
Despite Delaney's denial undei oath that she had evei had any preexisting left upper
extremity conditions (R 376 at pp 44-45), the ALT ultimately admitted the TOSH Physical
Therapy (2001) tecords showing that Delaney had, indeed, "suffered some left shouldei and
elbow pioblems in 2001 pnoi to her mdustiial accident on Febiuary 19, 2003 " Moreovei, the
ALT admitted a signed letter fiom WCF's Medical Dnectoi, Di Roger Stuart, M D dated May
1, 2003, which opined that "c[g]iven the delayed onset and distal involvement this [elbow

14

The lequest foi leconsideiation was actually entitled ' Appeal fiom Commissions Elleitson s Oidei of April 27
2006 , but the Laboi Commission ob\iously tieated it as a lequest foi leconsideiation (R 362)

8

condition] clearly does not meet the standards for probable medical causation and further
evaluation and treatment should be through [Delaney's] personal insurance. If it should be
identified as cervical origin, reevaluation for coverage would be appropriate.'" (R. 290 [quoting
Exhibit "R-l"]).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 34A-2-601 of the Utah Code accords discretion to the Labor Commission to
appoint a medical panel to determine medical issues. Under its rulemaking authority, the Labor
Commission has adopted Section R602-2-2 of the Utah Administrative Code, which provides
that a medical panel should be appointed when medical causation is at issue. Thus, since, based
upon the competing medical opinions, there was an issue of medical causation, the referral of
that issue to a medical panel was a proper exercise of discretion. Moreover, under Section 34A2-802 of the Utah Code, the appointment of the physicians serving on the medical panel is not
subject to the provisions of Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to special
masters.

Therefore, the Labor Commission did not abuse its discretion by allowing the

appointment of Dr. Laird Swenson to the panel to stand, absent a showing by Delaney that Dr.
Swenson was, in fact, prejudiced by his relationship with TOSH and, through it, PCFH.
Although the ALJ apparently did not include the IME report of Dr. Dan J. Hammon,
M.D., which was admittedly favorable to Delaney, in the medical records transmitted to the
medical panel, it was not an abuse of discretion in light of the fact that the ALJ also apparently
failed to transmit the TOSH (2001) Physical Therapy records and Dr. Roger Stuart's report, yet
the medical panel still determined medical causation in WCF's favor.
Even though the IME report of Dr. Hammon was not transmitted to the panel, and despite
the TOSH Physical Therapy (2001) records and the opinion of Dr. Stuart also not being

9

transmitted to the panel, the ALJ's decision in the 3/6/06 Order, which was based upon the
medical panel opinion, was supported by substantial evidence. The Labor Commission properly
adopted the opinion of the medical panel.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ALJ DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY REFERRING THE
ISSUE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION TO A MEDICAL PANEL OR IN
ADOPTING THE PANEL'S REPORT DESPITE THE APPOINTMENT OF
DR. SWENSON
Delaney argues that because there was no dispute in the evidence regarding medical
causation, the ALJ should not have referred that issue to a medical panel.13 Although the TOSH
Physical Therapy (2001) records and Dr. Stuart's report were apparently not transmitted to the
panel, there was a medical dispute that justified the ALJ in refemng the matter to a medical
panel.
In Section 34A-2-601 of the Utah Code, the legislature granted discretion to the Labor
Commission to "refer the medical aspects of a case . . . to a medical panel appointed by an
administrative law judge."

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(l)(a) (2005).

Pursuant to its

rulemaking authority, Id. § 34A-1-104(1), the Labor Commission has promulgated a rule
providing that a medical panel should be appointed when there are "[conflicting medical
opinions related to the causation of the injury . . . ." Utah Admin. Code § R602-2-2 (2006).
Thus, the issue is whether, by refemng the issue of medical causation to a medical panel, the
ALJ abused the discretion accorded by Section 34A-2-601 by "exceeding] the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality,"

Neiclerhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. Tax

^ Although this issue is fust laised on appeal, foi ease of aigument, WCF will assume, arguendo, that it was
properly laised below, leaving to this court to deteimine whethei the issue is propeily befoie it.

10

Commission, 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah App 1993), King v Industrial Commission, 850 P 2d
1281, 1286 (Utah App 1993).
Delaney argues that since Dr. Stuart's report was unsigned, it was not "reasonable" to
lefer the medical causation to a medical panel. Assuming, arguendo, that an unsigned report
should not form the basis for a dispute, it is clear that, although it was not initially signed, Dr.
Stuart, report had been signed by the time of the hearing on June 3, 2004. In counsel's letter to
the ALJ of

May 13, 2004 m support of its motion for continuance and request for

reconsideration of the order granting the motion to strike, WCF stated that it intended to have Dr.
Stuart sign the then unsigned letter of May 1, 2003. (R. 94-95). At the hearing, counsel for
WCF offered the May 1, 2003 letter as an exhibit, describing it as a "signed copy of that." (R.
376 at pp. 5-6). Fmally, in the 8/25/05 Order, the ALJ described Dr. Stuart's letter as "originally
unsigned . . . [but] the respondents [WCF] obtained Dr. Stuart's signature on a copy of [the
letter] and offered it in evidence." (R. 290).
The ALJ appropriately found that Dr. Stuart's signed letter raised a dispute that
necessitated that the issue of medical causation be referred to a medical panel. In Willardson v.
Industrial Commission, 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court determined whether
the Labor Commission abused its discretion when it did not refer the issue of medical causation
to a medical panel. There, the injured worker filed a claim for back injury. He supported his
claim with one page Summary of Medical Record forms completed by two treating physicians.
The ALJ determined that those reports lacked medical credibility and, therefore, refused to refer
the issue of medical causation16 to a medical panel. The Industrial Commission Board of Review

16

Undei the then \eision of Section R602-2-2, medical causation was not one of the specified issues lequumg
lefenal to a medical panel Neveitheless, the supieme couit deteimined that the list of issues was not meant to be
exhaustive Id at 674

11

dffumed the ALl's decision and this court affiimed the Boaid of Review's decision The Utah
Supicme Court levetsed this court, holding that although the reports of the physicians did not
have any backgiound or lationale, it was an abuse of discretion for the ALJ not to lefei the
mattei of medical causation to a medical panel Id at 675
Heie, the leport fiom Dr Stuart is analogous to a Summaiy of Medical Recoid completed
by a treating physician Therefore, not only was it not an abuse of disci ction to lefei the issue of
medical causation to a medical panel based only upon Di Stuart's report, but under Willauhon,
it would likely have been an abuse of disci etion if the ALJ had not leferred the issue to a medical
panel
Delaney also contends that because of the relationship between Dr Swenson and TOSH
and, thiough it, to PCFH, it was a denial of due process for the Labor Commission to admit the
medical panel report without a showing that Dr Swenson was not prejudiced Delaney supports
this contention by arguing that a medical panel is analogous to a special master under Rule 53 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Piocedure Undei that rule, Delaney aigues, it was improper for the ALJ
to delegate discretion to the panel chairman, Dr Wirthhn, to appoint other members of the panel,
at least without Delaney having an opportunity to object to panel members17 and that once the
potential piejudice of Dr Swenson was raised by Delaney, the Labor Commission had an
affirmative obligation to show that Dr Swenson was not piejudiced
Section 34A-2-802 of the Utah Code governs the mles of evidence and piocedure that aie
applicable in Labor Commission adjudicative proceedings
Commission, including the AL1, "is not bound by

It provides that the Laboi

any technical or fonnal uiles of procedme,

othei than as provided in this section or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this chaptei

17

Again, although this issue was not laised below, foi ease of aigument, WCF will assume mguendo, that is was
piopeily laised below

12

. . The commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the
chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802(l) (2005). Thus, it is a matter of discretion, not Rule
53, as to how the commission governs and appoints medical panels appointed under Sections
34A-2-601 and R602-2-2.
It does not "exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" for the ALJ to allow the
medical panel chairman to appoint other members of the panel. The panel chairman is likely
better qualified than the ALJ to understand the medical issues presented and the specific
expertise needed to address those issues.
Likewise, it did not "exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" for the Labor
Commissioner to require Delaney to make a showing of how Dr. Swenson's professional
relationship to TOSH and PCFH in any way prejudiced his ability to be fair and impartial,
especially when it appears doubtful that Dr. Swenson even knew about TOSH's treatment of
Delaney in 2001. Moreover, since much of the medical evidence in favor of Delaney came from
PCFH, if Dr. Swenson could really be affected by his relationship with TOSH and, through it,
PCFH, it is just as plausible that his opinion would have been swayed in Delaney's favor, not
WCF's.
II.
THE LABOR COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
FAILING TO TRANSMIT DR. HAMMONDS IME REPORT TO THE
MEDICAL PANEL
Delaney also contends that the Labor Commission violated her constitutional right to due
process by not including the IME report of Dr. Dan J. Hammon, and some other records, in its
referral to the medical panel. Had those records been included, Delaney argues, the medical
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panel would have likely opined in her favor.

Because it was Delaney's own actions that

prevented the IME report from being transmitted to the panel, because it appears that the medical
panel also did not receive the TOSH Physical Therapy (2001) records and Dr. Stuart's report,
and because the panel obviously relied solely upon records from Delaney's health care providers
and the ALJ's findings of fact in the 8/25/05 Order, such failure was not an abuse of discretion.
Again, Section 34A-2-601 of the Utah Code and Section R602-2-2 of the Utah
Administrative Code accord the ALJ with discretion regarding whether and what to refer to a
medical panel. And, although, based upon this very case, the ALJ should give the parties
latitude in introducing medical evidence supporting their positions, it was largely Delaney's own
actions that resulted in Dr. Hammon's report not being included in the medical records submitted
to the panel.
Based upon the Appeals Board grant of WCF's Motion for Review, in the 5/9/05 Order,
the ALJ reopened the medical record for three months to allow the parties to submit additional
medical records. WCF immediately reset the IME of Delaney with Dr. Hammon for June 28,
2005, more than a month before the additional records were due. Claiming that she still did not
have to comply with WCF's request for an IME18, Delaney notified WCF that she would
not be attending the IME. As a consequence, although WCF moved for an order compelling
Delaney's attendance at the IME, because the June 28, 2005 appointment was missed, the next
available date for the IME was August 16, 2005, which was a week after the supplemental
records were due to be filed. Also, after the motion to compel was granted, Delaney argued that
she would not have time to respond to Dr. Hammon's opinion, as allowed under the 5/9/05
Order. It was only after Dr. Hammon's report turned out to be favorable to Delaney that she

18

Delaney also claimed she had a scheduling conflict
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ceased her resistance to its being conducted or offered into evidence. Therefore, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the ALJ, and later the Labor Commissioner, to find that it was appropriate
to close the record before Dr. Hamnion's report could be submitted.
Since the medical panel apparently also did not receive the TOSH Physical Therapy
(2001) records or Dr. Stuart's report, it is, likewise, doubtful that even if the medical panel had
received Dr. Hammon's report, it would have changed its opinions. The medical panel focused
its opinions on the early treatment course set forth in the treating providers' reports and the
ALJ's description of the mechanism of injury in the findings of fact of The 8/25/05 Order. Thus,
although Dr. Hammon's report may have made the medical panel "think twice" about its opinion
on causation,
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had it had the TOSH and Stuart reports, they would have served to bolster the

panel's opinion on the other hand. Thus, it did not "exceed the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality" for the Labor Commission to admit and adopt the opinions of the medical panel even
without Dr. Hammon's report.
III.
THE ALJ'S FINDING OF LACK OF MEDICAL CAUSATION WAS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Delaney finally argues that the ALJ's finding of lack of medical causation was not
supported by substantial evidence in accordance with that standard of review set forth in Acosta
v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67, ^[ 29, 44 P.3d 819; see also, Grace Drilling Co. v. Board
of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (1989) (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257,
715 P.2d 927, 930 n.5 (1985)).

Although, since WCF requested the report, it was somewhat unexpected that Dr. Hammon would opine in favor of
Delaney, not WCF, WCF was certainly not bound by Dr. Hammon's opinion in opposition to Dr. Stuart's opinion,
any more than a claimant would be bound by an unfavorable opinion from one treating physician in opposition to
another treating physician.
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Of course, it is clear that the ALJ's finding was supported by substantial evidence; namely,
the opinion of the medical panel. That is not to say that there is not also evidence to support a
contrary conclusion; for example, the documented opinion of Delaney's treating health care
providers and even Dr. Hammon.2() But, Delaney is required to martial the evidence in support
of the Labor Commission's finding and then demonstrate that, despite those supporting tacts, and
in light of the conflicting and contradictory evidence, those findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998).
Here, in focusing on whether the evidence supporting the medical panel is supported by
substantial evidence, Delaney has failed to marshal key evidence in support of the ALJ's
ultimate finding of lack of medical causation; namely, the medical panel report itself. As already
discussed in Points I and II, supra, the Labor Commission did not abuse its discretion in referring
the issue of medical causation to the medical panel, despite the allegations of prejudice in Dr.
Swenson and the fact that some of the medical evidence was not included in the transmittal to the
panel. Therefore, Delaney should have considered the medial panel's opinion in meeting her
martialling requirement.

Since she did not, this court should give the Labor Commission's

determination of lack of medical causation due deference.
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Just because Dr. Hammon's report was not submitted to the panel, it does not mean that the ALJ and/or Labor
Commissioner could not have considered it in making its ultimate finding of fact on medical causation. See IGA
Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(e). But see, Shipley v. C &
W Contracting Co., 528 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Utah 1974) (ALJ's reliance upon medical panel opinion appropriate,
despite other significant evidence to the contrary); Workers Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d
572, 575-76 (Utah App. 1988) (although it was error for ALJ to consider medical commentary not admitted into
evidence, such error was harmless because there was evidence to support the ALJ's finding of medical causation).
Obviously, the ALJ and Labor Commissioner chose to follow the opinion of the medical panel rather than that of Dr.
Hammon, Dr. Sellers or any other health care provider that opined in Delaney's favor.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this court should affirm the Order Denying Motion for
Review of the Labor Commissioner.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ^ d a y of March, 2007.

^J/^~—
Floyd A^Alolm
Attorney for Respondents Park City Family
Healthcare and Workers Compensation Fund

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this f~~ day of March, 2007, copies of the foregoing
were mailed, postage paid, to the following:
James A. Mclntyre
J. David Milliner
MCINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.
3838 South West Temple, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Alan Hennebold, Esq.
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
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Text of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802 (2005)

A

§ 34A-2-802. Rules of evidence and procedure before commission -- Admissible
evidence

(1) The commission, the commissioner, an administrative law judge, or the
Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence,
or by any technical or formal rules or procedure, other than as provided in this
section or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this chapter and Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its investigation in such
manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the chapter.
(2) The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute
all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to the following:
(a) depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings;
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists;
(c) reports of investigators appointed by the commission;
(d) reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts, or other
records; or
(e) hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee.

Text of Utah Admin. Code § R602-2-2 (2006)

B

R602-2-2. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.

Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the following guidelines in
determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or more
significant medical issues maybe involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical issues are involved when there
are:
1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease;
2. Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more
than 5% of the whole person,
3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary
more than 90 days;
4. Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total disability,
and/or
5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $10,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is a proffer
of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report.
Where there is a proffer of newT written conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative
Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for
consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to be examined
by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical examination or
evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing
these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment rating, and/or
2. A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical consultant
and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, as directed by Section 34A-2-601.

Order, dated May 9, 2005 (5/9/05 Order)

C

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

PHOEBE E. PASHUTA,
Petitioner,
ORDER
vs.
Case No. 20031149
PARK CITY FAMILY HEALTHCARE
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND,

Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse

Respondents,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that pursuant to the Order Granting Motion for Review the
respondents shall by August 9, 2005 file a new Medical Records Exhibit with a copy to
petitioner containing all medical records pertaining to any medical issues raised in this case
including causation. The respondents shall also include in the new Medical Records Exhibit all
medical treatment notes or other relevant medical records that came into existence since the last
hearing on this matter.
ORDERED that petitioner shall have until August 19, 2005 to file any
objections to the new Medical Record Exhibit.

1T IS F U R T H E R

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that after August 19, 2005 I shall consider the matter ready for
issuance of a new order consistent with the factual findings of the first hearing and the new
Medical Records Exhibit.

DATED THIS May 9, 2005.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Order
Phoebe E Pashuta vs. Park City Family Healthcare and/or Workers Compensation Fund Case
No. 20031149
Page 2
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Order was mailed by prepaid U.S.
postage on May 9, 2005, to the persons/parties at the following addresses:
Phoebe E Pashuta
P O Box 681291
Park City UT 84068
Floyd Holm Esq
392 E 6400 S
P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Clerk, Adjudication Division

f\r\*

^v ^

Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(8/25/05 Order)

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
POBox 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

PHOEBE E PASHUTA,
Petitioner,

INTERIM FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

vs.
PARK CITY FAMILY HEALTHCARE
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND,
Respondent.

Case No. 20031149
Judge Richard M LaJeunesse

HEARING:

Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on June 3, 2004 at 1:00 p.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFOIi E:

Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Phoebe E. Pashuta, was present and represented herself pro
se.
The respondents, Park City Family Healthcare and Workers Compensation
Fund, were represented by attorney Floyd Holm Esq.
L STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The petitioner, Phoebe Pashuta, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor
Commission on November 19, 2003 and claimed entitlement to the following workers'
compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care; (3) temporary total
disability compensation; (4) temporary partial disability compensation; (5) permanent partial
disability compensation; (6) permanent total disability compensation, and; (7) mileage
reimbursement for travel to medical treatment. Ms. Pashuta's claim for workers' compensation
benefits arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on February 19, 2003.
The respondents denied that Ms. Pashuta actually suffered an industrial accident on February 19,
2003 in the maimer she described. The respondents also raised some medical causation issues
disposed of in a motion filed by Ms. Pashuta described more fully supra.
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II. ISSUES.
1. Did Phoebe Pashuta sustain an injury to her left arm on February 19, 2003 while
employed at the Park City Family Medical Center?
2. What workers' compensation benefits, if any, do the respondents owe Phoebe Pashuta?
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
Ms. Pashuta filed her Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission on November
19, 2003. On April 13, 2004 Ms. Pashuta filed a "Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer and
Grant Judgment for the Petitioner." On April 30, 2004 I issued an "Order on Motion to Strike
Defendants' Answer and Grant Judgment for the Petitioner" (Order on Motion). I granted the
Order on Motion in part and denied it in part. In my Order on Motion I struck the respondents'
defenses based on issues of medical causation or preexisting medical problems for the reasons
set forth therein.
At the hearing on June 3, 2004 I excluded Exhibits "R-l" and "R-2" proffered by respondents in
belated support of their defenses based medical causation and preexisting medical problems. I
also excluded petitioner's Exhibit's "P-3," "P-6" and "P-7."
On June 3, 2004 I held an evidentiary hearing in this matter on issues except medical causation.
On November 26, 2004 I issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order awarding Ms.
Pashuta workers' compensation benefits.
The respondents filed a Motion for Review on December 21, 2004. The Appeals Board issued
an Order Granting Motion for Review and Order of Remand (Order of Remand) on April 29,
2005. The Appeals Board determined that respondents should have been allowed to present their
defenses concerning the medical causation of Ms. Pashuta's left upper extremity problems.
On May 9, 2005 I issued an Order and gave the respondents until August 9, 2005 to file a new
medical records exhibit with any additional medical records that came into existence since the
last hearing. As of the date of this Order the respondents filed no new medical records.
Accordingly, I closed the evidentiary record and deemed the matter ready for the present Order.
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IV. FINDINGS OF FACT.
A.

Prior Orders.

The respondents presented no new medical evidence in this case to support their defenses
denying a medical causal connection between Ms. Pashuta's left upper extremity problems and
her industrial accident on February 19, 2003. However, consistent with the Order on Remand I
now accept into evidence Exhibits "R-l" and "R-2" previously excluded in my first Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
I already took evidence on all the relevant facts in this case except medical causation during the
evidentiary hearing on June 3, 2004, and therefore adopt the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law set forth in my November 26, 2004 Order except as to medical causation. For the sake of
clarity I repeat herein the pertinent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted herein.
B.

Employment.

At all times relevant to this case Park City Family Healthcare (PCFH) employed Ms. Pashuta as
an x-ray technician.
C.

Compensation Rate.

As of February 19, 2003, Ms. Pashuta was not married and had no dependent children. The
parties stipulated that Ms. Pashuta's compensation with PCFH at the time of the accident in issue
equaled $13.04 per hour, 40 hours per week, for a workers' compensation rate of $348.00 per
week. [$13.04/hour x 40 hours/week = $521.60/week x 2/3 = $348.00/week].

D.

February 19, 2003 Inch isti ial Accident.

PCFH employed Ms. Pashuta as an x-ray technician. On February 19, 2003 Ms. Pashuta worked
for PCFH at the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic taking x-rays. Ms. Pashuta used an old x-ray machine
that had some mechanical problems. While at work for PCFH on February 19, 2003, Ms. Pashuta
prepared the x-ray machine at the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic to take an upright view of a
patient's shoulder. Ms. Pashuta positioned the patient standing against a wall. Ms. Pashuta then
unlocked the arm of the x-ray machine from the column and extended the arm so she could
position the tube in relation to the patient's shoulder. Ms. Pashuta placed her left hand under the
collimator so that she could twist and hold it in place. The 25 pound collimator kept slipping and
swinging down because of a missing collimator knob on the x-ray machine. Ms. Pashuta pushed
the collimator up with force to make it stay in position. The collimator swung down, forced her
left arm down and hit Ms. Pashuta in the chest. Under the sudden weight of the 25 lb collimator
swinging downward, the 85 lb. arm of the x-ray machine also moved down onto Ms. Pashuta's
left arm.

Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
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Arm and collimator 851bs.

E.

Left Arm Injury Caused by the February 19, 2003 Industrial Accident.

On May 9, 2003 Ms. Pashuta5s treating nurse practitioner June Neeley MS APRN stated:
We continue to believe that her neck and arm pain is related to the injury with the
x-ray machine on February 19, 2003. [Exhibit U J-1" at 27].
In a treatment note dated May 22, 2003 June Neeley assessed Ms. Pashuta with:
1. myofascial pain (L) neck, trapezius,
2. (L) rotator cuff strain, improving
3. Ulnar nerve compression syndrome, [id. at 19].
On June 5, 2004 Ms. Pashuta saw Dr. Daniel Sellers M.D. a hand surgeon who stated:
She comes to see me for an injury to the left arm. This was suffered about four
months ago when she was catching a tipping-over x-ray machine.... [id. at 6].
On August 8, 2003 Dr. Sellers operated on Ms. Pashuta and performed a: "Left cubital tunnel
release of anterior subcutaneous transposition." [Exhibit "J-2" at 54]. Dr. Sellers postoperatively
diagnosed Ms. Pashuta with: "Persistent left medial epicondylitis and ulnar neuropathy." [id.].
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On December 9, 2003 Dr. Sellers performed repeat surgery on Ms. Pashuta:
Exploration of left elbow wound, lysis of ulnar nerve at elbow, with more medial
transposition, multiple-layer fixation of subcutaneous tissue to anterior surface of
flexor pronator mass, medial epicondyle, and medial subcutaneous tissue, [id. at
59].
Dr. Sellers diagnosed Ms. Pashuta postoperatively with: "Subluxation of left ulnar nerve at
elbow status post left ulnar nerve transposition (subcutaneous)." [id.].
The respondents relied on Exhibits "R-l" and "R-2" challenging the medical causal link between
Ms. Pashuta's left upper extremity problems treated by Dr. Sellers and the February 19, 2003
industrial accident. Exhibit "R-2" contained some documents that indicated Ms. Pashuta
suffered some left shoulder and elbow problems in 2001 prior to her industrial accident on
February 19, 2003. Exhibit "R-l" constituted an internal "Medical Director Review" completed
by the insurance company's Physician Reviewer, Dr. Roger Stuart, on May 1, 2003. Originally
completed as an unsigned, confidential document not intended for release from the insurance
adjuster's file, the respondents procured Dr. Stuart's signature on a copy of Exhibit "R-l" and
offered it in evidence. Dr. Stewart opined that:
Given the delayed onset and distal involvement this clearly does not meet the
standards for probable medical causation and further evaluation and treatment
should be through her personal insurance. If it should be identified as cervical
origin, revaluation for coverage would be appropriate. [Exhibit "R-l"].
Given the disagreement between Dr. Sellers, June Neely, and Dr. Stuart concerning the medical
cause of Ms. Pashuta's current left upper extremity problems, the issued must be referred to a
medical panel for consideration.
F.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation.

The parties stipulated that Ms. Pashuta missed work from March 1, 2002] to April 10, 2003,
August 8, 20032 to August 26, 2003, and from December 9, 2003 until January 29, 2004 [Exhibit
"J-2" at 62] due to her left arm injury following the February 19, 2003 industrial accident.
Accordingly, if determined that the industrial accident on February 19, 2003 caused her current
left upper extremity problems treated by Dr. Sellers then the respondents would owe Ms. Pashuta
$5,568.00 in temporary total disability compensation. [$348.00 per week x 16 weeks =
$5,568.00]. However, a final determination concerning liability for temporary total disability
compensation camiot be made until after the return of the medical panel report.
1

Although respondents stipulated that Ms. Pashuta missed work from February 19, 2003, until April 10, 2003, Ms.
Pashuta herself acknowledge that she first missed work on March 1, 2003.
2
Here the respondents stipulated that Ms. Pashuta missed work due to her first surgery commencing August 13,
2003 Howevei, the surgery actually took place on August 8, 2003. [Exhibit "J-2" at 54].
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G.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation.

Ms. Pashuta had not received an impairment rating with respect to her left arm injury caused by
the February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Therefore, the icsue of permanent partial disability
compensation remained unripe for determination at the time of the June 3, 2004 hearing.
H.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation.

Ms. Pashuta acknowledged that she returned to work after her second operation and continued to
work at the time of the hearing on June 3, 2004. Therefore, Ms. Pashuta had no claim for
permanent total disability compensation at the time of the June 3, 2004 hearing.
I.

Travel Expenses.

Ms. Pashuta submitted into evidence with rebuttal Exhibit u P-4" a summary of all the travel
mileage accrued as part of her medical treatment for her left upper extremity problems after the
February 19, 2003 industrial accident. According to Exhibit "P-4" Ms. Pashuta amassed 1606
miles obtaining medical treatment for her left upper extremity problems after the February 19,
2003 industrial accident. Accordingly, if determined that the industrial accident on February 19,
2003 caused her current left upper extremity problems treated by Dr. Sellers then the respondents
would owe Ms. Pashuta $ 554.07 in mileage reimbursement. [$0.345/mile x 1606 miles =
$554.07].
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
A.

Prior Orders.

I adopt the Conclusions of Law set forth in my November 26, 2004 Order except as to medical
causation. For the sake of clarity 1 repeat herein the pertinent Conclusions of Law adopted
herein.
B.

Employment.

At all times relevant to this case Park City Family Healthcare (PCFH) employed Ms. Pashuta as
an x-ray technician.
C.

Compensation Rate.

As of February 19, 2003, Ms. Pashuta was not married and had no dependent children. The
parties stipulated that Ms. Pashuta's compensation with PCFH at the time of the accident in issue
equaled $13.04 per hour, 40 hours per week, for a workers' compensation rate of $348.00 per
week. [$13.04/hour x 40 hours/week = $521.60/week x 2/3 = $348.00/week].
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D.

Feb! urn \ 19, 2003 liuiusli lal Accident.

PCFH employed Ms. Pashuta as an x-ray technician. On February 19, 2003 Ms. Pashuta worked
for PCFH at the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic taking x-rays. Ms. Pashuta used an old x-ray machine
that had some mechanical problems. While at work for PCFH on February 19, 2003, Ms. Pashuta
prepared the x-ray machine at the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic to take an upright view of a
patient's shoulder. Ms. Pashuta positioned the patient standing against a wall. Ms. Pashuta then
unlocked the ami of the x-ray machine from the column and extended the ami so she could
position the tube in relation to the patient's shoulder. Ms. Pashuta placed her left hand under the
collimator so that she could twist and hold it in place. The 25 pound collimator kept slipping and
swinging down because of a missing collimator knob on the x-ray machine. Ms. Pashuta pushed
the collimator up with force to make it stay in position. The collimator swung down, forced her
left arm down and hit Ms. Pashuta in the chest. Under the sudden weight of the 25 lb collimator
swinging downward, the 85 lb. arm of the x-ray machine also moved down onto Ms. Pashuta's
left arm.
E.

Left Arm Injury Caused by the February 19, 2003 Industrial Accident.

Given the disagreement between Dr. Sellers, June Neely, and Dr. Stuart concerning the medical
cause of Ms. Pashuta's current left upper extremity problems, the issued must be referred to a
medical panel for consideration.
F.

Temporary Total Disability ( ompnisalion.

Ms. Pashuta missed work from March 1, 2002 to April 10, 2003, August 8, 2003 to August 26,
2003, and from December 9, 2003 until January 29, 2004 due to her left arm injury following the
February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Accordingly, if determined that the industrial accident on
February 19, 2003 caused her current left upper extremity problems treated by Dr. Sellers then
the respondents would owe Ms. Pashuta $5,568.00 in temporary total disability compensation.
[$348.00 per week x 16 weeks = $5,568.00]. However, a final determination concerning liability
for temporary total disability compensation cannot be made until after the return of the medical
panel report.
G.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation.

Ms. Pashuta had not received an impairment rating with respect to her left arm injury caused by
the February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Therefore, the issue of permanent partial disability
compensation remained unripe for determination at the time of the June 3, 2004 hearing.

nnooo
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H.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation.

Ms. Pashuta acknowledged that she returned to work after her second operation and continued to
work at the time of the hearing on June ^, 2004. Therefore, Ms. Pashuta had no claim for
permanent total disability compensation at the time of the June 3, 2004 hearing.
I.

Travel Expenses.

Ms. Pashuta amassed 1606 miles obtaining medical treatment for her left upper extremity
problems after the February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Accordingly, if determined that the
industrial accident on February 19, 2003 caused her current left upper extremity problems treated
by Dr. Sellers then the respondents would owe Ms. Pashuta $ 554.07 in mileage reimbursement.
[$0.345/mile x 1606 miles - $554.07].
VI. ORDER.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the issue concerning the medical causal connection
between Phoebe Pashuta's current left upper extremity problems and her industrial accident on
February 19, 2003 shall be referred to a medical panel for consideration.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issues of respondents' liability for temporary total
disability compensation, medical treatment expenses, and travel reimbursement are reserved for
final order after referral to a medical panel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Phoebe Pashuta's claims for permanent partial, and
permanent total, disability compensation are dismissed without prejudice as unripe for
determination.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Phoebe E. Pashuta shall provide to me all radiology
films of her left upper extremity no later than September 26, 2005. Failure to submit the films
may result in certain aspects of Phoebe Pashuta's case not being considered, or dismissal of her
Application for Hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as this is an Interim Order and not a Final Order, any Motion
for Review or Appeal of this Order shall be reserved until the Final Order is issued in this matter.
Accordingly, deadlines will respect to Motions for Review and/or Appeal shall not commence to
run until after the Final Order is issued in this case.
DATED August 25, 2005.
Richard Ml La Jeunesse
Admmjstrative Law Judge
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Date of Panel- January 11, 2006
Petitioner:
Phoebe E. Pashuta
Employer:
Park City Family Health Care and
Workers Compensation Fund
Date of Injury: February 19, 2003
LC#
20031149
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT
A medical panel consisting of Laird Swensen, M.D., and Alvin J. Wirthlin, M.D., with the latter
as chairman, met to evaluate the case of Phoebe E. Pashuta with reference to an injury reported to
have occurred on February 19, 2003.
Indexed medical records from 11 medical providers and institutions were reviewed comprising
nearly 400 pages. The history was reviewed with the applicant and she was examined by the
panel members.
INJURY AND TREATMENT HISTORY
The petitioner was employed as an x-ray technician for Park City Family Health Care and was
assigned to the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic, taking x-rays. The Findings of Fact outline a
description of the older x-ray machine and the petitioner's difficulty trying to get the collimator
to stay up. As described by the petitioner and the Findings of Fact, the collimator swung down,
forcing her left arm in a downward position and striking her in the chest. The sudden weight of
the 2 5-lb collimator swinging downward and the 8 5-lb arm of the x-ray machine also moving
downward was attempted to be supported by the petitioner's left arm, flexed at the elbow. This
therefore represents a sudden resisted flexion at the elbow. This incident occurred on the 19th of
February 2003.
The petitioner reports to the panel that she developed pain in the midthoracic region, reported the
incident, and was seen at the Park City Family Health Urgent Care Center, where the diagnosis
was a thoracic strain. This was not severe enough to prevent returning to regular employment.
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The location of the pain was midline in the midback, more on the right side Subsequent visits
on the 3,(l of March 2003 refer to a fever and cough without mention of back or a» m problems,
and again on the 4th of March 2001 complaining of vomiting, dizziness, and congestion No
mention is made of back or arm symptoms The next note referring to the injury and pain
occurred on A.pril 1, 2003, by June Neeley, nurse practitioner, who comments that symptoms at
first were worse on the right side and now were worse on the left side with radiating pain to the
little finger. She found pain to palpation over the cervical spine at C6-7, pain with rotation of the
neck, and pain to palpation over the left paraspinous muscles in the neck, left trapezius, with
trigger points. She had a positive Tinel's sign at the cubital tunnel and Guyon's canal on the left,
and positive Tinel's sign over the median nerve. There was decreased sensation in the left arm in
all distributions. The assessment was left paraspinous trapezius strain and positive trigger points
in the left paraspinous and trapezius regions.
The petitioner continued treating with June Neeley, NP, receiving Percocet, Skelaxin, physical
therapy, ibuprofen, and trigger point injections. An authorization to return to work dated April
10, 2004 listed restrictions of no repeated bending, stooping, lifting, or twisting; limited use of
the left hand, and weight lifting restrictions of zero to ten pounds. Subsequently the petitioner
also underwent further trigger point injections and AC, subacromial bursae injections with an
impression of myofascial pain. A note on April 22, 2003 indicates the impression of left
shoulder/neck strain.
On May 9, 2003, June Neeley, NP, wrote a letter to the Workers Compensation Fund claims
adjustor explaining her belief that the petitioner's neck and arm pain was related to the injury
with the x-ray machine on February 19, 2003. She explained that the six-week delay in seeking
medical care after the injury was a result of the petitioner not receiving instructions about follow
up.
On May 15, 2003, the petitioner was seen by Denise Skuster for an EMG/NCV study. The actual
numbers are not included but the impression was very mild electrodiagnostic evidence of median
nerve entrapment at the wrist on the left but no definite evidence of an ulnar neuropathy at the
elbow. There is a report that there was some slowing of nerve conduction velocity around the
elbow segment but the importance of this cannot be assessed without reviewing the numbers.
There was no evidence of cervical radiculopathy on needle examination.
By May 22, 2003, June Neeley began to diagnose myofascial pain left neck and trapezius, left
rotator cuff strain, and left ulnar nerve compression syndrome.
On the 3rd of June 2003 June Neeley sent a referral letter to Dr. Daniel Sellers, orthopedic
surgeon and hand specialist. In this letter it is stated the petitioner developed increased pain in
her left arm three to four weeks after the initial injury which seemed to shoot proximally and
distally from the elbow region.
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The petitioner began treating with Daniel Sellers, M.D. on June 5, 2003. His initial note
indicates that the petitioner was treated with injections for trigger points, physical therapy to her
neck, and cc...and basically everything was resolved except for some pain in her left elbow
region." He records numbness along the ulnar nerve distribution and comments on the nerve
conduction study, which he felt was contributoiy evidence to a diagnosis of tardy ulnar palsy.
There were no symptoms of a left carpal tunnel syndrome. He found a positive TineFs sign both
at the elbow and the wrist over the ulnar nerve with normal two-point discrimination in the ulnar
fingertips. He injected the medial epicondyle region and the subcutaneous tissue, and after two
sets of injections with continued symptoms he planned surgery. In fact, since that time the
petitioner has undergone four surgical procedures by Dr. Sellers involving the left elbow. On
August 13, 2003, the petitioner underwent bilateral breast reduction surgery with suction-assisted
lipectomy in addition to her left anterior subcutaneous ulnar nerve transposition. A subsequent
operation was performed on December 9, 2003 with exploration of the left elbow wound with
lysis of the ulnar nerve at the elbow and a more medial transposition. With continued symptoms
a third surgery was done in January of 2005 for a submuscular ulnar nerve transposition.
Apparently the last surgery occurred in August of 2005 for which there are no records.
The Findings of Fact document a medical record review, an internal document generated by the
Workers Compensation Fund suggesting standards of probable medical causation had not been
met. In addition, there is reference made to an injury in 2001 involving the left shoulder.
A note on July 23, 2001 indicates pain located in the left shoulder and elbow. A further note
dated July 27, 2001 done in physical therapy indicates that her left elbow was bothering the
petitioner with shooting pain down the backside of the upper arm to the elbow. In addition, pins
and needles sensation was recorded from the left side of her neck to her fingers.
The panel members questioned the petitioner closely about the time course of her symptoms,
noting June Neeley reported left ulnar symptoms four weeks after the incident. The petitioner
herself indicates that those symptoms may have occurred two to four weeks after the injury. In
describing the injury itself, it is apparent there was no direct injury to the elbow.
CURRENT SYMPTOMS
The petitioner is right-handed. She reports after four surgeries she continues to have pain in her
left elbow region. Because of pain, which may extend from the mid-to-upper arm down the
forearm to the hand, she cannot do such things as holding a jug of milk. However, the pain
comes and goes depending on her activity. She reports generally less strength in her hand and
arm than before. She uses her left arm less because of a fear of increasing her pain and reinjuring
herself. The elbow region is continually sore. She reports she has intermittent tingling and loss
of feeling in the ulnar fingers on the left extending into the middle finger. She reports she tends
to drop things. Currently she has a desk job only and does not do x-ray technician duties.
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PAST MEDICAL HISTORY, SOCIAL HISTORY, AND FAMILY HISTORY
Note is made of the complaints in 2001 involving the left elbow for which Vv: petitioner has no
memory whatsoever. In the past she has been treated for asthma, bronchitis, ovarian cysts, and
chronic pelvic pain. She has had a right salpingooophorectomy, laparoscopy, D&C, and breast
reduction surgery in addition to her four elbow surgeries.
EXAMINATION
The petitioner sat comfortably throughout the history-taking and physical examination. As there
are no rating questions, a particularly detailed examination was not undertaken.
There is a healed scar, somewhat hypertrophic, red and raised, over the elbow region.
Elbow range of motion is normal.
Wrist range of motion is normal
Range of motion in all fingers is normal.
There is normal capillary refill.
Temperature is symmetrical in both hands, as is hair distribution, skin turgor, and color.
There is no change in her symptoms with elbow flexion and extension.
A motor examination reveals normal wrist flexion against resistance without weakness. This is
true of wrist extension as well.
There is a negative Froment sign and a negative Wartenberg sign.
There is some weakness demonstrated in the profundus muscle with testing of finger flexors.
There is some variability in intrinsic hand muscle strength testing.
There is a report of altered sensation in the medial forearm from the elbow to the wrist, as well as
a report of some decreased sensation in the fourth and fifth fingers in the left side, but also
spilling over into the middle finger.
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X-RAY REVIEW
A plain x-ray of the elbow was reviewed with no disagreements from the olfxial interpretation.
CONCLUSIONS
Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was involved in circumstances as outlined, and
acknowledging the stipulation of facts, the panel concludes in terms of reasonable medical
probability as follows:
1.

Please identify the left upper extremity problems, if any, caused by Phoebe E. Pashuta's
industrial accident on February 19, 2003.
Answer: The panel members agree, based on initial symptoms and treatment, that
the petitioner suffered a thoracic strain. We did not identify any other upper
extremity problems caused by the industrial accident of February 19, 2003. Dr.
Sellers characterized the petitioner's ulnar nerve problem as a tardy ulnar palsy.
We could not overcome the difficulty in ascribing this to a single injury event,
particularly the one described. It is not probable that an episode of resisted
flexion at the elbow would produce a direct ulnar nerve injury. It is clear from the
record that there was no direct blow or injury to the elbow itself. Thus, a
mechanism of injury is not present. Furthermore, a conclusion of causation would
have to overcome the observation that at least two and as many as four weeks
passed before ulnar nerve symptoms were appreciated. This would not be the
expected time course for an injury to the ulnar nerve which occurred on the 19th of
February 2003. Therefore, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the
left ulnar nerve problems were the result of the industrial accident on February 19,
2003.
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Respectfully submitted,

Alvin J. Wirthlin, M D.
Neurologist
Panel Chairman

^ffhA^

Laird Swensen, M.D.
Orthopedic Surgeon
Panel Member
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
POBox 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

PHOEBE E. PASHUTA,
Petitioner,
|

vs.
PARK CITY FAMILY HEALTHCARE
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER
Case No. 20031149
Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse

Respondents,

HEARING:

Room 334 Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on June 3, 2004 at 1:00 p.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Phoebe E. Pashuta, was present and represented herself pro
se.
The respondents, Park City Family Healthcare and Workers Compensation
Fund, were represented by attorney Floyd Holm Esq.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The petitioner, Phoebe Pashuta, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor
Commission on November 19, 2003 and claimed entitlement to the following workers'
compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care; (3) temporary total
disability compensation; (4) temporary partial disability compensation; (5) permanent partial
disability compensation; (6) permanent total disability compensation, and; (7) mileage
reimbursement for travel to medical treatment. Ms. Pashuta's claim for workers' compensation
benefits arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on February 19, 2003.
The respondents denied that Ms. Pashuta actually suffered an industrial accident on February 19,
2003 in the manner she described. Respondents also refuted a medical causal connection
between Ms. Pashuta's left upper extremity problems and the industrial accident on February 19,
2003.
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II. ISSUES.
1. Did Phoebe Pashuta sustain an injury to her left arm on February 1 04 2003 while
employed at the Park City Family Medical Center?
2. What workers' compensation benefits, if any, do the respondents owe Phoebe Pashuta?
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
Ms. Pashuta filed her Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission on November
19, 2003. On April 13, 2004 Ms. Pashuta filed a "Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer and
Grant Judgment for the Petitioner." On April 30, 2004 I issued an "Order on Motion to Strike
Defendants' Answer and Grant Judgment for the Petitioner" (Order on Motion). I granted the
Order on Motion in part and denied it in part. In my Order on Motion I struck the respondents'
defenses based on issues of medical causation or preexisting medical problems for the reasons
set forth therein.
At the hearing on June 3, 2004 I excluded Exhibits "R-l" and "R-2" proffered by respondents in
belated support of their defenses based medical causation and preexisting medical problems. I
also excluded petitioner's Exhibit's "P-3," "P-6" and "P-7."
On June 3, 2004 I held an evidentiary hearing in this matter on issues except medical causation.
On November 26, 2004 I issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order awarding Ms.
Pashuta workers' compensation benefits.
The respondents filed a Motion for Review on December 21, 2004. The Appeals Board issued
an Order Granting Motion for Review and Order of Remand (Order of Remand) on April 29,
2005. The Appeals Board detemiined that respondents should have been allowed to present their
defenses concerning the medical causation of Ms. Pashuta's left upper extremity problems.
On May 9, 2005 I issued an Order and gave the respondents until August 9, 2005 to file a new
medical records exhibit with any additional medical records that came into existence since the
last hearing. As of the date of this Order the respondents filed no new medical records.
Accordingly, 1 closed the evidentiary record issued my Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order on August 25, 2005.
On August 25, 2005 1 sent the parties a proposed medical panel referral and gave the parties 15
days to object to the form of the referral. Neither party filed any objections to the proposed
medical panel referral.
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I sent the Medical panel Referral in this case on September 28, 2005. The appointed Medical
Panel issued a report on February 16, 2006. I sent the Medical Panel Report to the parties on
February 16, 2006 and gave them 15 days to file any objections to the Medical Panel report. Ms.
Pashuta filed her objections to the Medical Panel Report on March 3, 2006.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT.
A.

Prior Orders.

The respondents presented no new medical evidence in this case to support their defenses
denying a medical causal connection between Ms. Pashuta's left upper extremity problems and
her industrial accident on February 19, 2003. However, consistent with the Order on Remand I
accepted into evidence Exhibits "R-l" and "R-2" previously excluded in my first Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
I already took evidence on all the relevant facts in this case except medical causation during the
evidentiary hearing on June 3, 2004, and therefore adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law set forth in my November 26, 2004 Order except as to medical causation. For the sake of
clarity I repeat herein the pertinent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted herein.
B.

Employment.

At all times relevant to this case Park City Family Healthcare (PCFH) employed Ms. Pashuta as
an x-ray technician.
C.

Compensation Rate.

As of February 19, 2003, Ms. Pashuta was not married and had no dependent children. The
parties stipulated that Ms. Pashuta's compensation with PCFH at the time of the accident in issue
equaled $13.04 per hour, 40 hours per week, for a workers' compensation rate of $348.00 per
week. [$13.04/hour x 40 hours/week = $521.60/week x 2/3 - $348.00/week].
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D.

February 19, 2003 Industrial Accident.

PCFH employed Ms Pashuta as an x-ray technician On February 1°). 2003 Ms Pashuta worked
for PCFH at the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic taking x-rays. Ms. Pashuta used an old x-ray machine
that had some mechanical problems. While at work for PCFH on February 19, 2003, Ms. Pashuta
prepared the x-ray machine at the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic to take an upright view of a
patient's shoulder. Ms. Pashuta positioned the patient standing against a wall Ms. Pashuta then
unlocked the arm of the x-ray machine from the column and extended the arm so she could
position the tube in relation to the patient's shoulder. Ms. Pashuta placed her left hand under the
collimator so that she could twist and hold it in place. The 25 pound collimator kept slipping and
swinging down because of a missing collimator knob on the x-ray machine. Ms. Pashuta pushed
the collimator up with force to make it stay in position. The collimator swung down, forced her
left arm down and hit Ms. Pashuta in the chest. Under the sudden weight of the 25 lb collimator
swinging downward, the 85 lb. arm of the x-ray machine also moved down onto Ms. Pashuta's
left arm.

Arm and collimator 85lbs.

column

E.

Collimator
251bs

Left Arm Injury Caused by the February 19, 2003 Industrial Accident.

On May 9, 2003 Ms. Pashuta's treating nurse practitioner June Neeley MS APRN stated:
We continue to believe that her neck and arm pain is related to the injury with the
x-ray machine on February 19, 2003. [Exhibit "J-l v at 27].
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In a treatment note dated May 22, 2003 June Neeley assessed Ms. Pashuta with:
1. myofascial pain (L) neck, trapezius.
2. (L) rotator cuff strain, improving
3. Ulnar nerve compression syndrome. [Id. at 19].
On June 5, 2004 Ms. Pashuta saw Dr. Daniel Sellers M.D. a hand surgeon who stated:
She comes to see me for an injury to the left arm. This was suffered about four
months ago when she was catching a tipping-over x-ray machine.... [Id. at 6].
On August 8, 2003 Dr. Sellers operated on Ms. Pashuta and performed a: "Left cubital tunnel
release of anterior subcutaneous transposition." [Exhibit "J-2" at 54]. Dr. Sellers postoperatively
diagnosed Ms. Pashuta with: "Persistent left medial epicondylitis and ulnar neuropathy." [Id.].
On December 9, 2003 Dr. Sellers performed repeat surgery on Ms. Pashuta:
Exploration of left elbow wound, lysis of ulnar nerve at elbow, with more medial
transposition, multiple-layer fixation of subcutaneous tissue to anterior surface of
flexor pronator mass, medial epicondyle, and medial subcutaneous tissue. [Id. at
59].
Dr. Sellers diagnosed Ms. Pashuta postoperatively with: "Subluxation of left ulnar nerve at
elbow status post left ulnar nerve transposition (subcutaneous)." [Id.].
The respondents relied on Exhibits "R-l" and "R-2" challenging the medical causal link between
Ms. Pashuta's left upper extremity problems treated by Dr. Sellers and the February 19, 2003
industrial accident. Exhibit "R-2" contained some documents that indicated Ms. Pashuta
suffered some left shoulder and elbow problems in 2001 prior to her industrial accident on
Febmary 19, 2003. Exhibit "R-l" constituted an internal "Medical Director Review" completed
by the insurance company's Physician Reviewer, Dr. Roger Stuart, on May 1, 2003. Originally
completed as an unsigned, confidential document not intended for release from the insurance
adjuster's file, the respondents procured Dr. Stuart's signature on a copy of Exhibit "R-l" and
offered it in evidence. Dr. Stewart opined that:
Given the delayed onset and distal involvement this clearly does not meet the
standards for probable medical causation and further evaluation and treatment
should be through her personal insurance. If it should be identified as cervical
origin, reevaluation for coverage would be appropriate. [Exhibit "R-l"].
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Given the disagreement between Dr. Sellers, June Neely, and Dr. Stuart concerning the medical
cause of Ms. Pashuta's current left upper extremity problems, I referred the issue to a medical
panel for consideration.
On February 16, 2006 the Medical Panel filed a report. The Medical Panel consisted of the
chair, Dr. Alvin Wirthlin M.D. a neurologist, and panel member, Dr. Laird Swensen M.D. an
orthopedic surgeon. The Medical Panel reviewed the medical records contained in Exhibit "J-l,"
fct
R-l" and "R-2." [Medical Panel Report pp. 1]. The Medical Panel examined Ms. Pashuta. [Id.
at pp. 1 and 4]. Finally, the Medical Panel reviewed the radiology films provided by the parties.
[Id. at p. 5]. The Medical panel concluded that:
The panel members agree, based on initial symptoms and treatment, that the
petitioner suffered a thoracic strain. We did not identify any other upper
extremity problems caused by the industrial accident of February 19, 2003.
*sM«#

* * * * * *

[I]t is not reasonably probable that the left ulnar nerve problems were a result of
the industrial accident on February 19, 2003. [Id. at p. 5].
I found the Medical Panel Report thorough and well reasoned.1 Accordingly, the preponderance
of the evidence in this case established that Ms. Pashuta's industrial accident on February 19,
2003 caused her to suffer a thoracic strain but not the left ulnar nerve problems surgically
addressed by Dr. Sellers.
F.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation.

The parties stipulated that Ms. Pashuta missed work from March 1, 20032 to April 10, 2003,
August 8, 20033 to August 26, 2003, and from December 9, 2003 until January 29, 2004 [Exhibit
"J-2" at 62] due to medical problems following the February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Yet,
as found in Section IV.E. Ms. Pashuta's industrial accident on February 19, 2003 caused her to
suffer a thoracic strain, but not the left ulnar nerve problems surgically addressed by Dr. Sellers.

1

Ms. Pashuta's objections to the Medical Panel Report primarily consisted of her disagreement with the Medical
Panel's reading of the Medical Record and the weight accorded to various entries in the Medical Record Exhibit.
Contrary to Ms. Pashuta's critique, I found the Medical Panel Report to be an unbiased, objective analysis of the
medical evidence.
2
Although respondents stipulated that Ms. Pashuta missed work from February 19, 2003, until April 10, 2003, Ms.
Pashuta herself acknowledged that she first missed work on March 1, 2003.
' Here the respondents stipulated that Ms. Pashuta missed work due to her first surgery commencing August 13,
2003. However, the surgery actually took place on August 8, 2003. [Exhibit "J-2" at 54].
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As of May 22, 2003 June Neeley continued to treat Ms. Pashuta for:
1. myofascial pain (L) neck, trapezius.
2. (L) rotator cuff strain, improving
3. Ulnar nerve compression syndrome. [Exhibit "J-1" at 19].
The left neck and trapezius problems treated by June Neely as late as May 22, 2003 came under
the thoracic anatomical problems caused by Ms. Pashuta's industrial accident on February 19,
2003. However, on June 5, 2004 Ms. Pashuta began treatment with Dr. Sellers who concentrated
treatment on her left ami problems principally for left ulnar nerve problems. [Id. at 6]. Dr.
Seller's treatment of Ms. Pashuta led to a series of left elbow surgeries commencing on August
8, 2003 when he performed a: "Left cubital tunnel release of anterior subcutaneous
transposition." [Exhibit "J-2" at 54]. hi sum, Ms. Pashuta's medical problems that disabled her
from work between August 8, 2003 and January 29, 2004 primarily involved her left ulnar nerve
problem. As found in Section IV.E. Ms. Pashuta's industrial accident on February 19, 2003 did
not cause her left ulnar nerve problems.
Consequently, the respondents owed Ms. Pashuta temporary total disability compensation in the
amount of $2,039.28 for the 5.86 weeks between March 1, 2003 and April 10, 2003 when she
still treated for thoracic related problems caused by the February 19, 2003 industrial accident.
Thereafter, the respondents owed Ms. Pashuta nothing further by way of temporary total
disability compensation for work missed due to left ulnar nerve problems.
G.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation.

Ms. Pashuta had not received an impairment rating with respect to her thoracic problems caused
by the February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Therefore, the issue of permanent partial disability
compensation remained unripe for determination as of the date of this Order.
H.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation.

Ms. Pashuta acknowledged that she returned to work after her second operation and continued to
work at the time of the hearing on June 3, 2004. Therefore, Ms. Pashuta had no claim for
permanent total disability compensation as of the date of this Order.
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I.

Travel Expenses.

Ms. Pashuta submitted into evidence with rebuttal Exhibit "P-4" a summary of all the travel
mileage accrued as part of her medical treatment for her left upper extremity problems alter the
February 1 9, 2003 industrial accident. According to Exhibit "P-4" Ms. Pashuta amassed 1606
miles obtaining medical treatment for her left upper extremity problems after the February 19,
2003 industrial accident. However, Ms. Pashuta failed to distinguish the dates of service so that
a finding could be made specifically as to travel actually associated with treatment necessitated
by medical problems actually caused by the February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Therefore,
Ms. Pashuta failed to meet her burden of proof with respect to the mileage issue and none can be
awarded under the circumstances.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Prior Orders.

I adopted the Conclusions of Law set forth in my November 26, 2004 Order except as to medical
causation and the undecided issues awaiting the Medical Panel Report.
B.

Employment.

At all times relevant to this case PCFH employed Ms. Pashuta as an x-ray technician.
C.

Compensation Rate.

As of February 19, 2003, Ms. Pashuta was not married and had no dependent children. Ms.
Pashuta's compensation with PCFH at the time of the accident in issue equaled $13.04 per hour,
40 hours per week, for a workers' compensation rate of $348.00 per week. [$13.04/hour x 40
hours/week - $521.60/week x 2/3 - $348.0G/week].
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D.

February 19, 2003 Industrial Accident.

PCFH employed Ms. Pashuta as an x-ray technician. On February 19, 2003 Ms. Pashuta worked
for PCFH at the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic taking x-rays. Ms. Pashuta used an old x-ray machine
that had some mechanical problems. While at work for PCFH on February 19, 2003, Ms. Pashuta
prepared the x-ray machine at the Canyons Ski Patrol Clinic to take an upright view of a
patient's shoulder. Ms. Pashuta positioned the patient standing against a wall. Ms. Pashuta then
unlocked the arm of the x-ray machine from the column and extended the arm so she could
position the tube in relation to the patient's shoulder. Ms. Pashuta placed her left hand under the
collimator so that she could twist and hold it in place. The 25 pound collimator kept slipping and
swinging down because of a missing collimator knob on the x-ray machine. Ms. Pashuta pushed
the collimator up with force to make it stay in position. The collimator swung down, forced her
left ami down and hit Ms. Pashuta in the chest. Under the sudden weight of the 25 lb collimator
swinging downward, the 85 lb. arm of the x-ray machine also moved down onto Ms. Pashuta's
left ami.
E.

Left Arm Injury Caused by the February 19, 2003 Industrial Accident.

Ms. Pashuta's industrial accident on February 19, 2003 caused her to suffer a thoracic strain but
not the left ulnar nerve problems surgically addressed by Dr. Sellers.
F.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation,

Ms. Pashuta missed work from March 1, 2003 to April 10, 2003, August 8, 2003 to August 26,
2003, and from December 9, 2003 until January 29, 2004 due to her medical problems following
the February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Yet, as found in Section IV.E. Ms. Pashuta's
industrial accident on February 19, 2003 caused her to suffer a thoracic strain, but not the left
ulnar nerve problems surgically addressed by Dr. Sellers.
The left neck and trapezius problems treated by June Neely as late as May 22, 2003 came under
the thoracic anatomical problems caused by Ms. Pashuta's industrial accident on February 19,
2003. However, Ms. Pashuta's medical problems that disabled her from work between August 8,
2003 and January 29, 2004 primarily involved her left ulnar nerve problem. Ms. Pashuta's
industrial accident on February 19, 2003 did not cause her left ulnar nerve problems.
Consequently, the respondents owed Ms. Pashuta temporary total disability compensation in the
amount of $2,039.28 for the 5.86 weeks between March 1, 2003 and April 10, 2003 when she
still treated for thoracic related problems caused by the February 19, 2003 industrial accident.
Thereafter, the respondents owed Ms. Pashuta nothing further by way of temporary total
disability compensation for work missed due to left ulnar nerve problems.
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G.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation.

Ms. Pashuta had not received an impairment rating with respect to her thoracic problems caused
by the February 19, 2003 industrial accident. Therefore, the issue of permanent partial disability
compensation remained unripe for determination as of the date of this Order.
H.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation.

Ms. Pashuta returned to work after her second operation and continued to work at the time of the
hearing on June 3, 2004. Therefore, Ms. Pashuta had no claim for permanent total disability
compensation as of the date of this Order.
I.

Travel Expenses.

Ms. Pashuta failed to meet her burden of proof with respect to the mileage issue and none can be
awarded under the circumstances.
VI. ORDER.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Park City Family Healthcare and/or Workers
Compensation Fund shall pay Phoebe E. Pashuta temporary total disability compensation
from March 1, 2003 to April 10, 2003 at the rate of $348.00 per week for 5.86 weeks, in the total
amount of $2,039.28, under Utah Code §34A-2-42- (3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule
612-1-5. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent
(8%) per annum, under Utah Code §34A-2-420 (3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Phoebe E. Pashuta's claim for permanent partial disability
compensation is hereby dismissed as unripe for decision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Phoebe E. Pashuta's claim for permanent total disability
compensation is hereby dismissed without prejudice as unripe for decision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Phoebe E. Pashuta's claim for mileage reimbursement is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Park City Family Healthcare and Workers Compensation
Fund shall pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Phoebe E. Pashuta's thoracic problems
caused by her industrial accident of February 19, 2003 according to Utah Code § 34A-2-418, and
the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission plus interest at eight
percent (8%) per annum, under Utah Code § 34A-2-420 (3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule
612-2-13.
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DATED March 6, 2006.

[

Richard M. \ a jfeunesse
^^-Adiiiinisii'at^e Law J udge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on March 6, 2006, to the persons/parties at
the following addresses:
Phoebe E Pashuta
PO Box 681291
Park City UT 84068
Floyd Holm Esq
392E6400S
P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Clerk, Adjudication Divisiop
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615

Order Denying Motion for Review, dated April 27, 2006
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
PHOEBE E. PASHUTA,
Petitioner,
ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.
PARK CITY FAMILY HEALTHCARE
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,

Case No. 03-1149

Respondents.

Phoebe E. Pashuta asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge La
Jeunesse's decision regarding Ms. Pashuta's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Ms. Pashuta seeks workers' compensation benefits from Park City Family Healthcare and its
insurance earner, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to jointly as "Healthcare" hereafter), for
thoracic and left arm injuries allegedly caused by a work-related accident at Healthcare on Febmaiy
19, 2003. Judge La Jeunesse held an evidentiary hearing on Ms. Pashuta's claim on June 3, 2004,
and then, after various intermediate adjudicative steps,1 referred the medical aspects of the claim to
an impartial medical panel.
The medical panel submitted its report on February 16, 2006. In summary, the panel opined
that while Ms. Pashuta had suffered a thoracic strain from the accident at Flealthcare, her left arm
problems were not caused by the accident. On March 6, 2005, Judge La Jeunesse accepted the
medical panel's opinion and awarded benefits for Ms. Pashuta's thoracic injury, but denied benefits
for her left arm problems.
Ms. Pashuta now asks the Commission to review Judge La Jeunesse's decision. Ms. Pashuta
argues that, contrary to the medical panel's opinion, the preponderance of evidence establishes that
her accident at Healthcare caused her left arm injuries. Ms. Pashuta also argues that Dr. Swenson's
service on the medical panel taints the panel's opinion. Finally, Ms. Pashuta objects to activities of
Healthcare's representatives in investigating Ms. Pashuta's claim.

1 These intermediate adjudicative actions are set out m Judge La Jeunesse's decision of March 6,
2006, and wall not be restated here.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge La Jcunesse's iindingb ui facL.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers to pay
workers' compensation benefits to employees injured by accident "arising out of and in the course
o f their employment. In other words, only work-related injuries are compensable under the Act,
and injuries are not work-related unless the work is both the "legal" and the "medical" cause of
injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1()86). It is the question of medical
causation that is at issue in this case.
Workers' compensation proceedings often involve complex medical issues. For that reason,
§34A-2-601 of the Act authorizes the Commission to appoint impartial medical panels to consider
the medical aspects of such cases. The Commission's Rule 602-2-2 establishes the circumstances
when the Commission will use its discretion to convene a medical panel. There is no dispute that the
conditions of Rule 602-2-2 were satisfied in this case and that Judge La Jeunesse properly appointed
a medical panel to consider the medical aspects of Ms. Pashuta's claim. What is in question is the
degree of reliance that should be placed on the medical panel's report.
Ms. Pashuta argues that Dr. Swenson's service as a panel member was improper and
therefore tainted the panel's opinion. The basis for this assertion is Dr. Swenson's affiliation with
"TOSH," the clinic where Ms. Pashuta received her physical therapy. Ms. Pashuta also reports that
TOSH receives referrals from Healthcare, Ms. Pashuta's employer. However, Ms. Pashuta has
failed to explain how Dr. Swenson's ordinary professional relationship with TOSH had any actual
effect on his impartiality or performance as a member of the medical panel, nor do Dr. Swenson's
circumstances give rise to any reasonable perception of partiality. The Commission therefore rejects
Ms. Pashuta's objections to Dr. Swenson's participation on the panel.
Ms. Pashuta also challenges the substance of the panel's opinion. The Commission has
reviewed that opinion, together with other medical information in the record. In evaluating the
opinion, the Commission notes that the medical panel is not affiliated with either party in this
dispute. Furthermore, the panel had the important advantage of access to all Ms. Pashuta's medical
records and the opinions of the other health care professionals who treated or examined her. The
panel also had the opportunity to personally examine Ms. Pashuta. Finally, the panel brought
together experts from different medical disciplines. With the foregoing foundation, the Commission
is persuaded by the panel's collegial opinion that Ms. Pashuta's work accident did not cause her left
arm problems. Consequently, Ms. Pashuta is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for such
problems.
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As a final matter, the Commission notes the complaints Ms. Pashuta has lodged against
Healthcare's representatives. The substances of those complaints, even if true, would not alter the
Commission's determination that Ms. Pashuta's left arm problems are not compensable under the
workers' compensation system.

ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge La Jeunesse's decision and denies Ms. Pashuta's motion for
review. It is so ordered.
Dated this ^J

day of April, 2006.

/

-1 ^c^^^^SM^^
R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify thai a copy oi the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Phoebe E. Pashuta, Case No. 03-1149, was mailed first class postage prepaid I h i s ^ r d a y of April,
2006, to the following:
Phoebe E. Pashuta
PO Box 681291
Park City UT 84068
Park City Family Healthcare
1665 Bonanza Dr
Park City UT 84060
Floyd Holm Esq
392 E 6400 S
P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, dated June 29, 2006
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
PHOEBE E. PASHUTA,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION

PARK CITY FAMILY HEALTHCARE
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,

Case No. 03-1149

Respondents.

Phoebe E. Pashtita asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision denying
a portion of Ms. Pashuta's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act";
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-13.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
This matter arises out of Ms. Pashuta's claim for workers' compensation benefits from Park
City Family Healthcare and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to jointly as
"Healthcare" hereafter). Specifically, Ms. Pashuta has alleged thoracic and left arm injuries caused
by an accident at Healthcare on February 19, 2003.
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge La Jeunesse referred the medical aspects of Ms.
Pashuta's claim to a medical panel. The panel concluded that Ms. Pashuta's thoracic problem was
work related, her left arm problems were not. Judge La Jeunesse accepted the medical panel's
opinion and awarded benefits only for Ms. Pashuta's thoracic injury.
Ms. Pashuta then asked for Commission review of Judge La Jeunessc's decision. In her
motion for review, Ms. Pashuta urged the Commission to disregard the medical panel's opinion and
to instead conclude that the preponderance of medical evidence established that her accident at
Healthcare caused her left arm injuries.
On April 27, 2006, the Commission denied Ms. Pashuta's motion for review and upheld
Judge La Jeunesse's decision. Ms. Pashuta now asks the Commission to reconsider its decision. In
support of this request for reconsideration, Ms. Pashuta reiterates her belief that medical opinion
submitted by her treating physicians and other medical experts is entitled to greater weight than the
medical panel's opinion.
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DISCUSSION
The Commission has considered Ms. Pashuta's request for reconsideration in light of the
evidentiary record and the Commission's previous decision in this matter. For the reasons stated in
its previous decision, the Commission continues to view the medical panel's opinions as persuasive.
The Commission therefore finds no reason to modify its previous decision.
ORDER
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Ms. Pashuta's request for
reconsideration. It is so ordered.
Dated this <2J

day of June, 2006.

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For
Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the
matter of Phoebe E. Pashuta, Case No. 03-1149, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this
Jff day of June, 2006, to the following:
Phoebe E. Pashuta
PO Box 681291
Park City UT 84068
Park City Family Healthcare
1665 Bonanza Dr
Park City UT 84060
Floyd Holm, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund
Legal Dept
Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84157

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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